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Summary. — The difference in the descriptions of motion phenomena made by
pupils in the first grades of secondary school and physicists is quite evident. Con-
ceptual metaphors hidden in language suggest that there is continuity between the
conceptual structure involved in the description and the interpretation of motion of
experts and laypersons. In this paper the presence of such a continuity is shown
through a metaphor analysis of linguistic expressions from both groups.
1. – Introduction
We know from literature (DiSessa, 1993; McCloskey, Caramazza, and Green, 1980)
that students face difficulties in studying motion and its causes. We argue that if we
want to address these problems, we have to investigate the conceptualization of motion.
We are going to investigate the conceptual structure involved in the description of
motion of laypersons, i.e. students, and of experts, i.e. teachers, scientists, physicists.
We argue that some kind of continuity should be present between these two kinds of
conceptualization and that physics education should be built upon it.
In the first part of this article we are going to illustrate how it is possible to understand
how the concept of motion is constructed in the human mind. A theory that relates
mind and language is presented starting from the works of Lakoff, Johnson, Turner and
Fauconnier.
In the second part we will show the analyses carried out of two different sources of
language, the first representing the scientific conceptualization, the second the lay one.
In the last part the evidence and the results of the analyses are presented and
discussed.
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2. – A theory of mind
In cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor is defined as understanding one concep-
tual domain (target domain) in terms of another conceptual domain (source domain).
Lakoff, Johnson and Turner underline the deep and strong connection between language
and mind. According to these authors, the nature of the conceptual structure that we
use to think, speak and act is figurative. As a consequence, conceptual metaphors play
an important role in structuring knowledge. They are systematic in that there is a fixed
correspondence between the structure of the domain to be understood (e.g., death) and
the structure of the domain in terms of which we are understanding it (e.g., departure).
We usually understand them in terms of common experiences. They are largely uncon-
scious, though attention may be drawn to them. Their operation in cognition is almost
automatic. And they are widely conventionalized in language, that is, there are a great
number of words and idiomatic expressions in our language whose meanings depend upon
those conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). Metaphor is no longer seen as
a mere linguistic and aesthetic feature: the cognitive role of metaphor emerges in the
process of structuring and acquiring new knowledge. In synthesis, a concept is constituted
by the metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
Moreover, according to Fauconnier and Turner, in the human mind there are entire
networks of projections between conceptual spaces leading to what have been known as
conceptual integration networks (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998, 2002; Fauconnier, 1994,
1997).
As a consequence, we can understand the way we think about our conceptualization of
motion, looking at the way we speak, in particular at the conceptual metaphors implied
in the language we use to talk and describe motion.
We have to make a distinction between metaphor and metaphoric linguistic expres-
sion: the latter is what we hear or read when somebody uses a metaphor, the former is a
figure of the mind, we might say the actual concept. We will show an example in order
to evidence the difference.
Heat flows through the walls of the building
is the metaphorical expression of the metaphor:
Heat Is A Fluid Substance
We will use small caps in order to distinguish between the conceptual metaphors and the
metaphorical expressions.
3. – Language analyses
In order to compare the two forms of conceptualization of motion we selected two
sources of sentences about motion: the first volume of “The Feynman lectures on Physics”
(Feynman, 1965) as a source of scientific language, and recordings of college students en-
rolled in physics courses collected in the paper “Common sense concepts about mo-
tion” by Halloun and Hestenes as a source of lay language (Halloun and Hestenes,
1985).
We looked for the sentences containing the word “force” and we tried to see the un-
derlying conceptual metaphor. We constructed the categories of conceptual metaphors in
a recursive way in order to have the most general and encompassing ones. We developed
the conceptual metaphor categorization starting from the Force Dynamic Gestalt theory
(Fuchs, 2007), image schemas (Johnson, 1990) and event structures (Lakoff and Johnson,
1999).
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Here we present the list of metaphors involved in the description of the word “force”.
• Force Is A Substance-Like Quantity
◦ Force Is A Product
◦ Force Is A Quantity
◦ Force Is A Possession
• Force Is An Agent
◦ Force Is A Compulsion
◦ Force Is A Resistance
• Force Is A Medium
• Force Is A Path
◦ Force Is A Line
◦ Force Is A Connection
• Force Is A Scale
• Force Is Balance
The complete list of categorized sentences is presented in the following tables I–VI. The
first observation is that sentences from both expert and lay language are metaphorical
expressions contained in all these categories.
Table I. – Force Is A Substance-Like Quantity expressions.
Conceptual
metaphor sub-
category
Feynman expressions Students expressions
Force Is A
Product
This potentiality for producing a
force is called an electric field.
A source of the force.
The speed creates a force. The
force behind it. . .coming from
the throw.
Force Is A
Quantity
How much force would there be
More or less force is required.
There is very little force at any
appreciable distance.
As it goes down, the force of
gravity increases. . . and that’s
why the speed increases until
[gravity] equals this amount of
force. It provides the ball with
more and more force as it goes
down.
Force Is A
Possession
A spinning top has the same
weight as a still one. The weight
of the atom. These forces are
within the nuclei of atoms.
If the mass of block X is grea-
ter than the force [of pull] of Y ,
block X stays in place. . .it could
not be moved. [The moving body]
has still got some force inside.
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Table II. – Force Is An Agent expressions.
Conceptual
metaphor sub-
category
Feynman expressions Students expressions
(unsorted) The first charge will feel a certain
reaction force.
There is not a force [acting] on the
ball. Gravity means the same force
pulls on different objects.
Force Is A
Compulsion
Because of the action of a force,
the velocity changes. The force
which controls, let us say, Jupiter
in going around the sun.
A force only starts the motion. A
force is just changing the direction
of motion.
Force Is A
Resistance
It is a question of electrical forces
against which we are working. No
tangential force is needed to keep
a planet in its orbit.
A force has nothing to do with the
speed, it only has to keep the ball
moving.
Table III. – Force Is A Medium expressions.
Feynman expressions Students expressions
We shall have to hold the pis-
ton down by a certain force.
The gas exerts a jittery force.
That maximum speed is
always equal to the force
you apply.
Table IV. – Force Is A Path expressions.
Conceptual
metaphor sub-
category
Feynman expressions Students expressions
Force Is A
Line
The force in the vertical direction
due to gravity. The force is
directed along the line joining the
planet to the sun.
The ball goes out in the direction
of the resultant [of the forces].
Force Is A
Connection
The true nature of the forces
between the atoms.
none
Table V. – Force Is A Scale expressions.
Feynman expressions Students expressions
The force weakens as we go higher.
The more massive a thing is, the stronger the
force required to produce a given acceleration.
none
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Table VI. – Force Is Balance expressions.
Feynman expressions Students expressions
If the force between them were not balanced.
Talk only about excess forces.
All the internal forces will balance out.
none
Besides that, we also found some differences in the metaphorical expressions from the
two sources.
The Force Is A Product conceptual metaphor (table I) tells us that force could
be “produced”. The possible “producers” in Feynman’s expressions are the basic inter-
actions between objects, i.e. electrical and gravitational, while in students’ expressions
the “producers” are speed and aspects of motion.
In Force Is A Quantity metaphorical expressions (table I), Feynman only speaks
about the intensity of force, while in students’ language we find expressions that are
related to the concept of momentum or energy of a moving object.
Finally, the metaphorical expressions of Force Is A Possession (table I) in Feyn-
man are only about weight, while in laypersons we have expressions involving moving
objects, devices that produce movement (i.e. a cannon), and more abstract concepts as
power, inertia and velocity.
Some metaphorical expressions found in Feynman are not present in students’ ex-
pressions, but we think this could be due to the set of data chosen for this purpose. We
are almost sure that similar sentences could be found in students’ expressions if only we
could have a larger collection.
The metaphorical sentences in lay language often involved the terms “speed” or
“velocity”. In order to deepen our investigations we repeated the same analysis for
the sentences containing these two words.
The conceptual metaphors we found are listed below.
• Speed Is A Substance-like quantity
◦ Speed Is A Possession
◦ Speed Is A Quantity
• Speed Is A Location
◦ Speed Is A Level
◦ Speed Is A Scale
• Speed Is An Agent
◦ Speed Is A Force
◦ Speed Is A Maker
Table VII collects the categorization of the metaphorical sentences found in both sets
of data.
All the expressions belonging to the two sources fitted all these categories with only
one exception. Metaphorical expressions belonging to Speed Is An Agent can only be
found in students’ language.
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Table VII. – Speed and Velocity metaphors and metaphorical expressions.
Conceptual
metaphor
category
Conceptual
metaphor sub-
category
Feynman expressions Students expressions
Speed Is A
Substance-
like quan-
tity
Speed Is A
Possession
Motion of a body. If she kept
going with the same speed.
The velocity of the falling
ball.
Its speed remains con-
stant. Their speed gets
greater and greater. Both
should have the same
speed.
Speed Is A
Quantity
[. . .] if we increase the speed
of the atoms.
Its velocity keeps
increasing. The speed is
smaller. A new speed
bigger than the one it
had before.
Speed Is A
Location
Speed Is A
Level
At what speed is the radius in-
creasing She is going at that
speed. Some car can get from
rest to 60 miles an hour.
The ball must go at con-
stant speed. They can
reach a speed limit.
Speed Is A
Scale
It speeds up. The car was
slowing down. High speeds.
It speeds up for a short
while. It slows down.
Speed Is
An Agent
Speed Is A
Force
none The force due to the
air overcomes the ini-
tial velocity. The force
of velocity.
Speed Is A
Maker
none The speed creates a
force.
4. – Results and conclusions
This metaphor analysis is a powerful and sensible tool that allows us to investigate the
conceptual structure that both scientists and students use to understand and to explain
phenomena.
The first important result is that the metaphorical expressions coming from both lay
and expert language share the majority of the metaphors. This allows us to claim that
there is continuity between the two kinds of language.
We also revealed a metaphorical and conceptual mismatch involving velocity and
speed. In the analysis we discovered that Speed Is An Agent is a conceptual metaphor
only present in lay language (students). Therefore we could say that speed (and velocity)
is perceived and conceptualized as an agent only by laypersons (students), while this is
not true for scientists and experts (Feynman, 1965).
Another important result is that some aspects coming from the Force Dynamic Gestalt
theory, such as quantity, quality, intensity (Fuchs, 2007) are present in the metaphorical
expressions. Moreover they are not completely differentiated in lay language.
The presence of continuity tells us that it is possible to teach starting from the knowl-
edge pupils have already developed during their previous experience: we could use con-
ceptual metaphor as a basis for developing a physics curriculum.
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Physics teachers should be aware of the conceptual metaphors and how they relate
and overlap in order to create comprehension (i.e. conceptual integration networks). In
this sense we could say that an education based on conceptual metaphors could help
students to be aware of them in order to understand and relate the aspects involved in
the interpretation of motion and its causes.
In order to do so, further analysis should be done to reveal the logical connections and
the dependencies between concepts involved in the description of motion (momentum,
energy). A refined analysis should be done taking different language sources, both oral
and written.
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